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Formosa, China and the United Nations: Formosa in the World Community

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FORMOSA, CHINA,
AND THE
UNITED NATIONS

Formosa in the World Community

LUNG-CHU CHEN

HAROLD D. LASSWELL

St. Martin's Press, New York

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Preface

IN THIS POLICY-ORIENTED STUDY, we tackle the dilemma of Communist China for the United Nations and the United States by focusing on a most fundamental issue: Formosa. After examining the full range of policy alternatives open to American foreign policy makers and member states of the U.N., we conclude that a "one China, one Formosa" solution to Chinese participation in the U.N. and Formosa's dangerously ambiguous international status would best serve all our common interests. According to this formulation, Communist China would occupy "China's" seats in both the General Assembly and the Security Council in place of the Nationalist delegation; and simultaneously Formosa would be assured of admission to the U.N. after attaining independence through self-determination. We support this proposal with a detailed and anticipatory examination of the problems of implementation: the transition to an independent status and the ensuing task of building a viable and responsible Formosan nation. Our emphasis is on the present and the future, rather than the past.

In exploring, inventing, and evaluating alternative courses of action, we have operated within the framework of the policy sci-

ences. The policy sciences are concerned with analyzing the decision process in government and society, and with mobilizing all available knowledge for use in these decisions. In this way we seek to make our contribution to the ultimate goal—a world community of human dignity. It is our first responsibility and pleasure to acknowledge the fundamental contributions to this method (and its many applications) by our colleague, Myres S. McDougal, but in no way does this imply accountability on his part for the details of the present analysis or the specific proposals that we endorse.

Practical assistance for which we return thanks has come from Deans Eugene V. Rostow and Louis H. Pollak and their administrative associates at the Yale Law School, and especially from the Ogden Foundation in Mountainville, New York. We are particularly obligated to Mr. H. Peter Stern, Vice President of the Foundation, for his unfailing encouragement of the candid exploration of complex issues of government, law, and social process.

Working drafts of the book were distributed to scholars and officials specializing in Asian studies or international law and relations. It would be difficult to exaggerate the courtesies or the aid forthcoming from either the scholarly or the official community. Harassed with teaching, research, or consultation, or driven by the pressure of recurring crises, many people have nevertheless taken time to challenge, amplify, or otherwise contribute to an informal dialogue—in writing or conversation—that, if institutionalized and made continuing, would be a brilliant instance of what we call a “decision seminar.” At the risk of imputing a policy preference not necessarily theirs or an authentication of detail to which they dissent, we cannot refrain from giving explicit thanks to at least a few, notably (in alphabetical order): Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Massachusetts Institute of Technology; A. Doak Barnett, Columbia University; Inis L. Claude, University of Michigan; Karl W. Deutsch, Harvard University; John K. Fairbank, Harvard University; Rosalyn Higgins, the Royal Institute of International

Affairs; Neil H. Jacoby, University of California, Los Angeles; Charles E. Lindblom, Yale University; Lucian W. Pye, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Oscar Schachter, United Nations Institute of Teaching and Research; Egon Schwelb, Yale Law School; and Burns Weston, University of Iowa. For obvious reasons we must content ourselves with a blanket acknowledgment to officials and political personalities of all shades of opinion who are responsibly involved in public affairs.

It is gratifying to be more specific in acknowledging the abundant assistance of Rosann H. Bonaldo, Isabel Malone, Dorothy Egan, and Doris Moriarty, who executed our secretarial requests.

We are particularly fortunate in the alert, perceptive editing of the manuscript by Joan Levinson of St. Martin's Press.

L.C.C.

H.D.L.

Yale University, July, 1967

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The Issue

THE CHINESE QUESTION has been a major issue in the United Nations and a principal problem for the foreign policy of the United States since the launching of the U.N. and the transfer of power on the mainland to the Communists. The United Nations has continued to exclude Peking and accept Chiang Kai-shek's government on Formosa as authorized to speak for "China." During recent years misgivings about U.N. policy have increased as the Peking government retains its grip on the mainland and becomes a member of the nuclear club. In the perspective of many decision-makers and commentators it has become more and more incongruous that the most inclusive organization expressly concerned with world security should fail to include the effective rulers of the most populous nation on earth. More than incongruity is involved. How can a comprehensive world public order be achieved under such conditions? How can there be progress by noncommunication? How can the clouds of war, whether localized in Southeastern Asia or expanded to the globe, be dissipated under the present circumstances of nonparticipation?

The foreign policy of the United States is as embarrassed by

the Chinese question as is the United Nations. The initial support given by the government of the U.S. to Chiang's government in exile was an expression of fidelity to an old if not altogether satisfactory ally and of friendship for as many surviving elements of the mainland cataclysm as could reach the sanctuary of Formosa. Years of close association between American society and modernizing groups in China created a network of interlocking interests that were threatened and frustrated by the Communist takeover. The takeover itself came with unexpected suddenness to the overwhelming majority of Americans, and it precipitated a sequence of measures not necessarily calculated to serve the principal long-term interests of the United States.

The widespread expectation that the Communist regime would prove transitory has withered, notwithstanding the current upheavals on the China mainland caused by the "great proletarian cultural revolution." The long-term concern of American policy with world security—the principal objective sought through the United Nations—has seemed less and less adequately served by earlier commitments. The chronic failure of years of intermittent talks at the ambassadorial level in Warsaw is not to be accounted for by a single factor or by the refractoriness of a single issue. Nevertheless one issue persists like a giant landslide blocking the road to understanding. It is the Formosan question.

When a whole spectrum of acute problems—ranging from the status of Formosa, recognition, establishment of diplomatic relations, cultural exchange, trade, U.N. participation, wars of national liberation, to nonproliferation of nuclear weapons—demands simultaneous solution, there seems to be no practicable order of priority nor any guide out of the labyrinth. Policy advisors are baffled, and decision-makers hesitate to act. Useful though mincing steps to further common interests are put off again and again, in the elusive hope that a grandiose design aimed to "kill all birds with one stone" can be found.

A fresh way to tackle the China dilemma is to start with the

most fundamental issue by focusing on Formosa. If this perplexing problem can be illuminated, a much-needed sense of priority and proportion can be generated. Such an approach opens up the possibility of initiating a series of practical acts that would otherwise be postponed or overlooked, and which could make a timely contribution to solving an entanglement that defies a packaged solution.

The continuing victory of the United States in the Chinese participation question in the United Nations portends not solution but further gathering of the storm. Most certainly that issue will press for an early and serious solution in the immediate future. While the hostility generated by Peking's campaign of hatred and Washington's policy of "containment" may continue for some time, it is not out of the question that the U.N. may soon set out on a new course in regard to Chinese participation, even if strong U.S. opposition continues.

In seeking a solution to "China's" participation in the world body, attention immediately and inevitably centers on Formosa's status. Under these circumstances it is hardly advisable to continue the usual practice of treating the problem of Formosa casually. What is needed is a comprehensive study in depth of all that is at stake. Such a study can point to a wider range of policy options than are currently perceived either by leading figures in the U.N. or in Washington.

A thoroughgoing examination of Formosa's significance can contribute to the reconsideration of many relatively antiquated and unrealistic images presently shared by many leaders of American official and unofficial life. For example, most Americans are under the impression that while Chiang Kai-shek can no longer be taken seriously as a spokesman for the hundreds of millions of mainland Chinese, he can at least be accepted as a genuine voice of Formosa. These Americans are sure to be shocked when they are presented with a critical re-evaluation of this "truth." But as usual Americans do not like to be fooled, and will eventually be

grateful for a more realistic conception—that a neglected dimension of the Formosan problem, hence of the U.N. participation issue, is the principle of self-determination. When the situation is redefined, its problematic character will not dry up and blow away. On the contrary, new though manageable questions will arise. These issues, however, will be relevant to the reality; they will no longer depend on the dream world of defeated politicians and the impulsive generosity of well-meaning if misguided friends.

The present study must begin by scrutinizing the questions related to Chinese participation in the United Nations. In view of the legalistic tangle in which these matters are usually discussed, we shall chart a path through the current confusion before proceeding to the affirmative lines of policy that are, in fact, open in the situation. The agenda of our presentation, therefore, is: (1) the question of Chinese participation in the United Nations; (2) the applicability of the principle of self-determination to Formosa; (3) the provisional and transitional measures essential to Formosa's independence; and (4) a blueprint for building an independent Formosan nation state.

An Emerging Alternative: “One China, One Formosa”